SharpEddie47
Market Sharp
- Joined
- Mar 4, 2024
- Messages
- 856
- Reaction score
- 18
- Points
- 18
The price boost arrives in the notification. Team X to win, normally available at 2.0, boosted to 3.0 for today only.
The mathematical question: is this genuine value or is it marketing dressed as value.
Three scenarios.
First: the operator has assessed Team X's true probability at 40%. Their normal price of 2.0 implies 50%. They've now boosted to 3.0 implying 33%. Their own assessment of the true probability exceeds their boosted price. Genuine positive expected value, assuming you agree with their probability estimate.
Second: the operator has assessed Team X's true probability at 40%. Their normal price of 2.0 is already generous. The boosted price of 3.0 is significantly beyond their assessment. They're deliberately offering better than true value to attract action.
Third: the operator has assessed Team X's true probability at 55%, which their normal price of 2.0 obscures through margin. The boost to 3.0 still implies 33%, worse than their true assessment. They've created a boost that looks impressive relative to the pre-boost price but remains negative expected value against true probability.
The third scenario is more common than the first two combined.
The boost that's compared against the boosted operator's own pre-boost price rather than against Pinnacle or an efficient market reference: this is the sleight of hand. The reference point is the operator's own inflated pre-boost price, not the true probability. A boost from a bad price to a less bad price is not free money.
I track every boosted bet I've taken separately in the spreadsheet. The CLV on boosted selections measured against Pinnacle's closing line: marginally positive. The P&L: less positive than the CLV suggests it should be, which implies the selections are being chosen from a pool that's systematically less well-suited to my analytical approach.
The mathematical question: is this genuine value or is it marketing dressed as value.
Three scenarios.
First: the operator has assessed Team X's true probability at 40%. Their normal price of 2.0 implies 50%. They've now boosted to 3.0 implying 33%. Their own assessment of the true probability exceeds their boosted price. Genuine positive expected value, assuming you agree with their probability estimate.
Second: the operator has assessed Team X's true probability at 40%. Their normal price of 2.0 is already generous. The boosted price of 3.0 is significantly beyond their assessment. They're deliberately offering better than true value to attract action.
Third: the operator has assessed Team X's true probability at 55%, which their normal price of 2.0 obscures through margin. The boost to 3.0 still implies 33%, worse than their true assessment. They've created a boost that looks impressive relative to the pre-boost price but remains negative expected value against true probability.
The third scenario is more common than the first two combined.
The boost that's compared against the boosted operator's own pre-boost price rather than against Pinnacle or an efficient market reference: this is the sleight of hand. The reference point is the operator's own inflated pre-boost price, not the true probability. A boost from a bad price to a less bad price is not free money.
I track every boosted bet I've taken separately in the spreadsheet. The CLV on boosted selections measured against Pinnacle's closing line: marginally positive. The P&L: less positive than the CLV suggests it should be, which implies the selections are being chosen from a pool that's systematically less well-suited to my analytical approach.